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A Background to Variance Problems Under the




This article is an introduction to analysis of the variance prob-
lem in contract formation under the Uniform Commercial Code.'
The focus in this essay will be upon pre-Code approaches to resolv-
ing the variance problem. This work has several premises and
objectives. One premise is that, in order to correctly analyze a
problem, one must learn as much as possible about the problem
itself. A problem described under a single label may involve widely
divergent and different facts in specific cases, or it may occur in
widely various circumstances, and these matters may well affect
the solution which is thought to be correct. A second premise is
that history repeats itself in subtle and indirect ways. Old habits of
thought or assumptions about a problem may affect the way in
which we understand and construe a newer solution/statute or ap-
ply it. Identifying inadequate, antiquated habits of thinking about
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. B.A., 1963, University of
Pittsburgh; J.D., 1967, Duquesne University School of Law; LL.M., 1975, Yale University.
1. The Code section which addresses the variance problem is U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978).
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the variance problem may also help to ascertain whether similar
mistakes are occurring under the Code. A third premise is that
context is important. Analysis of the variance problem will require
examination of several contexts. Historical context often can show
fully the general varieties of a particular problem, as well as the
success or lack of it in various alternative solutions which have
been attempted. Examination of the various processes by which
the problem develops-its procedural context-also assists both in
understanding the dimensions of the problem and in assessing the
utility or desirability of various solutions. Finally, the context of
policies served by various solutions and approaches to the problem
must be examined.
This outline of the premises of the writer goes far toward identi-
fying the objectives of this article. One goal is to correct the record
about pre-Code treatment of variance. In doing so, it will be possi-
ble to identify more precisely the nature of the variance problem.
This focus on the problem will have the advantage of identifying
and isolating various prototype variance problems without strug-
gling to understand or apply a Code solution at the same time.
Understanding the problem will help to assess the usefulness of
the Code solution, or any solution for that matter. Another objec-
tive of examining pre-Code approaches and solutions to variance is
to correct the subtle and often indirect influence of traditional
modes of thought and analysis of variance, which were based upon
what this writer believes were incorrect descriptions of pre-Code
law on variance. Even though the substance of the law on variance
may have changed under the Code, old habits of thinking about
and characterizing variance problems and solutions must be identi-
fied. Modern thought and analysis, if founded upon older, incorrect
analyses of the problem and its solutions, may well adversely affect
what has occurred under the Code. A subsequent article will ana-
lyze Code cases in light of the insights and considerations devel-
oped here.
II. PRE-CODE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MIRROR IMAGES AND THEIR
SOLUTIONS
Most analyses of Uniform Commercial Code section 207 began
with the observation that it was a reaction to the mirror image
rule.' This observation was illustrated especially with reference to
2. The mirror image rule is the common law rule that the response to an offer, if it is
to operate as an acceptance, must match and conform to every term and particular of the
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leading cases such as Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.,3 and
was followed by a textual explication of the statute. This approach
was premised upon several unexamined or tacit assumptions. First,
it was assumed that the variance problem itself with which the
mirror image doctrine dealt, was relatively simple. A second unex-
amined assumption was the notion that the mirror image rule was
a simple, mechanical principle which could be rigidly applied. The
Poel court, later common law decisions, and Code analyses all
shared these assumptions, but because they were assumptions,
they were not examined or tested. We will now undertake that
task.
One typical expression of the mirror image rule in the early
twentieth century was that any variance in response to an offer
prevented that response from operating as an acceptance. For ex-
ample, in Mahar v. Compton,4 the court stated:
It is well settled . . . that ... it must be made to appear that there was,
not only a plain, unequivocal offer, but that the acceptance of such an offer
was equally plain and free from ambiguity. In other words, there must have
been an exact meeting of the minds of the contracting parties in respect to
every detail of the proposed contract; and if the precise thing offered was
not accepted, or if the acceptance was in any manner qualified ... the uni-
versal rule seems to be that no valid contract is thereby established, but
that such a modified or qualified acceptance must rather be treated as a
rejection to the offer.8
Thus, the mirror image rule required a "meeting of the minds."6
The rule appeared to focus upon the requirement of mutual assent,
a proposition which several cases appeared to recognize explicitly.7
Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collander Co.,s a well-known case
offer. A corollary of the mirror image rule is the last shot rule. This rule provides that a
variant response to an offer is also a counter-offer which may then be accepted by the per-
son who made the original offer. If this occurs, then the resulting contract consists of the
terms contained in the counter-offer.
3. 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
4. 18 A.D. 536, 45 N.Y.S. 1126 (1897).
5. 18 A.D. at 540-41, 45 N.Y.S. at 1128-29. See also Crown v. Goldsboro, 182 N.C. 217,
108 S.E. 735 (1921)(need meeting of minds on every detail); Stanley v. Gannon, 109 Misc.
611, 180 N.Y.S. 602 (1919)(need exact match on every detail); Howells v. Stroock, 30 Misc.
569, 63 N.Y.S. 1074 (1900)(slight variance means no meeting of minds); Marschall v. Eisen
Vineyard Co., 7 Misc. 674, 28 N.Y.S. 62 (1894)(slightest variance means counter-offer).
6. This phrase is part of the now rejected subjective theory of contracts. For the origin
of the phrase, see Farnsworth, Meaning in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943
(1967).
7. See El Reno Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Stocking, 293 II. 494, 127 N.E. 642 (1929)
and Barrow S.S. Co. v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 134 N.Y. 15, 31 N.E. 261 (1892).
8. 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
1984
Duquesne Law Review
which illustrated these pre-Code assumptions, also displayed the
confusion in analysis and application common to cases employing
the mirror image rule. In Poel, an exchange of correspondence oc-
curred after there had been oral negotiations between the parties
for the sale of rubber. In a letter from the purchaser which was the
purported acceptance, the phrase "[tihe acceptance of this order
which in any event you must promptly acknowledge . .." ap-
peared.9 The seller argued that because of this language, the reply
was qualified and thus did not constitute acceptance. The court
characterized the issue to be "whether these writings constitute a
contract between the parties,"10 and held that the correspondence
was not a contract because the acknowledgement provision was a
variance." Thus, the Poel decision appeared to hold that when
writings were exchanged, only the writings would be considered in
determining whether an acceptance had occurred and the intent of
the parties would be sought exclusively in the writings.12 Further-
more, the court held as a matter of law that the slightest variance
between the purported acceptance and the offer automatically and
conclusively established the offeree's intent to enter into a contract
only and exclusively upon all his terms.13
A. The Poel Decision and the Statute of Frauds
Closer analysis of the Poel opinion undertaken here, however,
leads to the conclusion that, given the precedents existing at the
time the case was decided, the result was probably incorrect. Many
cases decided prior to the Poel decision did not dictate such an
9. Id. at 317, 110 N.E. at 621.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 319, 110 N.E. at 622. The court reasoned:
That [acknowledgement] provision of the defendant's offer provided that the offer
was conditional upon the receipt of the order being promptly acknowledged. It em-
bodied a condition .... The import of this proposal was that the defendant should
not be bound until the plaintiffs signified their assent to the terms set forth ....
The plaintiffs did not acknowledge receipt of this order and the proposal remained
unaccepted. . . . When the plaintiffs submitted this offer in their letter. . . only one
of two courses of action was open to the defendant. It could accept the offer made
and thus manifest that assent . . . or it could reject the offer. There was no middle
course.
Id.
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
13. That the offeree-buyer in Poel in fact intended to conclude a contract was sug-
gested by an observation of the trial court that the market price for rubber fell drastically
between the time that the purported acceptance was sent and the time for performance. See
78 Misc. 311, 317, 139 N.Y.S. 602, 607 (1912).
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outcome and, further, the rationale for Poel was seriously mislead-
ing. An analysis of these earlier cases clearly demonstrates the mis-
understanding of the Poel court about the precedents in the area
which include confused statements of the applicable principles of
law and their rationales.
The first step in such an analysis must be to examine the Poel
litigation in the lower courts. Two issues were perceived there;
first, whether there was a contract, and second, whether there was
a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.1 4 The
trial court found that there was a contract on the basis that the
minds of the parties had met so clearly as to be "beyond ques-
tion."'" The existence of a contract appeared to have been so clear
to the appellate court that it focused principally upon the Statute
of Frauds issue. 16 Thus, the principal issue briefed by the parties
before the highest court of New York was the Statute of Frauds
question.
17
This description of the arguments and issues in the lower courts
is more than merely a matter of curiosity. Examination of the lan-
guage in Poel against this litigational history leads to the inevita-
ble conclusion that the rationale for that decision rested upon a
particular understanding of the Statute of Frauds requirements
and not upon any consideration of the policy or requirements of
the contract formation process.1 8
The importance of the Statute of Frauds to the Poel rationale
14. 159 A.D. 367, 144 N.Y.S. 727 (1913). Specifically, on appeal the court framed the
issues as "whether the plaintiffs established a contract valid within the statute of frauds,
and authority of defendant's agent to make the contract . I..." d. (emphasis added).
15. 78 Misc. at 316, 139 N.Y.S. at 606. The significant factors upon which the trial
court relied included all of the oral negotiations and other acts of the parties, the writings,
the actual understanding of the parties about whether a contract existed, and the fact that
the market price of the product had been steadily falling and, at the time of performance,
was well below the contract price.
16. See 159 A.D. at 373-78, 144 N.Y.S. at 731-34.
17. See 216 N.Y. at 311. The appellant's entire brief consisted of the following sen-
tence which was accompanied by a string citation: "No contract valid within the provisions
of the Statute of Frauds was proved." Id.
18. For example, the court explained that:
The plaintiffs cannot prevail upon the theory that the writings express a contract,
different in its terms and conditions from the contract which the parties entered into.
In order to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds the written note or
memorandum must include all the terms of the completed contract which the parties
made .... The application of this principle to the facts of the present case makes it
necessary that we should disregard the alleged oral agreement. . . and confine our
attention to the writings.
216 N.Y. at 314, 110 N.E. at 620-21 (emphasis added).
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was underscored by the precedents cited by the court. For exam-
ple, in Davis v. Shields,19 the stated issue was whether an oral
agreement had been reduced to a writing sufficient to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds. In that case, the court held that the plaintiff
could not recover under the Statute of Frauds because the memo-
randum did not contain the oral agreement. In the language of the
court, the memo was defective because it did not embody the "real
agreement" of the parties. 20 Thus, Davis did not hold that there
was not a contract, but that the contract-the real agreement-did
not satisfy the Statute of Frauds and was, therefore,
unenforceable.
Similarly, in Julliard v. Trokie,2 1 after oral negotiations had oc-
curred, the plaintiff sent a memorandum of the oral contract to the
defendant. The defendant replied that the writing was erroneous
and did not contain all of the agreed upon terms. At trial, the Stat-
ute of Frauds was interposed, and the court held that this statute
required that a writing, in order to be enforceable as a contract,
must embody all of the terms of a prior oral agreement.2 2 In addi-
tion, Leach v. Weil23 focused on the disparity between an oral
agreement and a subsequent writing. The court held that the writ-
ing failed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds because essential con-
tract terms were absent.
2 4
The Poel court also relied on the decision in Wright v. Weeks.2 5
In Wright, a writing referred to performance terms "as specified"
and the specifications referred to were oral.26 Holding that the re-
quirements of the Statute of Frauds had not been met, the court
reasoned that if a mere reference to a verbal agreement in a writ-
ing were held sufficient to satisfy the statute, then parties could
evade the statute by signing a writing which recited that they had
an oral contract.2 7 The court also suggested that if the writing is
19. 26 Wend. 341 (N.Y. 1841).
20. Id. at 349.
21. 139 A.D. 530, 124 N.Y.S. 121 (1910).
22. Id. at 533, 124 N.Y.S. at 123.
23. 129 A.D. 688, 114 N.Y.S. 234 (1908).
24. Id. at 691, 114 N.Y.S. at 236. The court explained that:
It does not suffice that the writing evidence a contract; it must embody the terms of
the contract actually made. The writing relied upon in this case does not embody all
of the terms of the contract actually made, hence such contract was void for not being
evidenced as the statute [of fraud] requires.
25. 25 N.Y. 153 (1862).
26. Id. at 156.
27. Id. at 157. The court reasoned that:
If the reference in a writing to a verbal agreement would let that agreement, where
Vol. 22:595
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vague or incomplete, it would not satisfy the Statute of Frauds.2
The Wright court's statement, that if "the reference [in a writing]
is to something verbal, or ultimately to a writing, through the me-
dium of something verbal. . .[tihe Statute [of Frauds] is not sat-
isfied,"29 emphasized that the entire rationale for the decision was
the Statute of Frauds. But the court distinguished between the is-
sue of whether a contract exists and whether a contract is enforce-
able under the Statute of Frauds. Under this view, the effect of
variance is not to prevent formation of a contract, but rather to
interfere with satisfaction of the Statute of Frauds, which renders
the contract unenforceable. The Poel decision utterly missed this
distinction.
The above line of authority cited in the Poel case focused wholly
upon the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and also made it
clear that variance does not prevent contract formation. Instead,
the cases provided that all major terms must be contained in writ-
ing for the contract to be enforceable. Based upon this reasoning, a
party did not need to present a variance argument in order to
avoid contractual liability but could do so merely by asserting that
the writing was incomplete because of a missing term or a refer-
ence to an oral specification. Thus, the approach fostered by the
Statute of Frauds in these cases led the courts to prescribe the
minimum content of the writing involved.
To the extent that the Statute of Frauds rationale of this line of
cases is the basis for the Poel mirror image rule, two conclusions
appear justified. First, because the Poel court conceded that the
Statute of Frauds was a major ingredient of that decision, it fol-
lows that not every variance can or should prevent formation of a
contract. Instead, the court's line of reasoning required that vari-
ances which violated the requirements of the Statute of Frauds
would prevent enforcement of an agreement. Under this approach,
mere variance as to minor matters had not in the past and should
not have prevented formation of an enforceable contract. But the
clear implication of the Poel opinion was that any and all vari-
the subject was one which the statute required to be in writing, it would be sufficient
for parties desiring to avoid the trouble of reducing their bargains to writing, to sign a
statement that they had contracted verbally respecting a given subject and they
would thus dispense with the statute.
Id. (Opinion by Denio, C.J.).
28. Id. at 160. Under this analysis, "If the [written] agreement be vague and indefi-
nite, so that the full intention of the parties cannot be collected from it, it cannot be said
that the contract is in writing and it is therefore void." Id. (Opinion by Allen, J.).
29. Id. at 157-58.
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ances, whether they fell within the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds or not, prevented formation of a contract.30
Second, since these cases relied upon in Poet involved interpre-
tation of a particular Statute of Frauds, when that Statute was
changed or amended, the rule as to variance which had evolved
from it should have been reexamined and probably changed. This
proposition seems almost too apparent to require restating: If the
reason for existence, or basis or rationale, of a particular principle
of law changes, then the principle should be reexamined to see if it
should be changed as well. Unfortunately, after the Poet decision,
the mirror image rule took on a life of its own, and later courts
citing Poet as precedent did not perceive the way in which the
Statute of Frauds issue and the contract formation issue had been
confused in that opinion.81
B. Other Precedents Misused in Poet
The Poet opinion also relied upon several cases which did not
involve the Statute of Frauds. All of these cases are also inapposite
and distinguishable. In the first of these cases, Nundy v. Ma-
thews,82 a plaintiff-creditor proposed compromise of an undis-
puted, liquidated claim against her debtor by immediate payment
of an amount less than the conceded claim. The defendant re-
sponded with a proposal that payment within one year should op-
erate as a discharge. The plaintiff did not reply, but more than one
year later sued to collect the lesser amount specified in the defen-
dant's reply on the basis that the defendant's reply amounted to a
"substantial acceptance" of her original offer.33 This contention
was rejected, with the explanation that when an answer varies the
terms of an offer, it is a rejection if it conditions and qualifies "ma-
terial" terms of the offer. 4 Thus, the premise of the Nundy hold-
ing was that the variance was material, a conclusion which was
clearly justified since the substance of the negotiations and the
principal concern of both parties was-as it will be in virtually all
compromise situations-at what time and in what amount the
debtor was to pay the creditor. Clearly, the case did not involve
change in a minor detail, but rather a change in a term about
30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Hoffstot v. Dickinson, 166 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1948); Raisler Heating Co. v.
Clinton Wire Cloth Co., 168 N.Y.S. 668, 670 (1918).
32. 41 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 74 (1884).
33. Id. at 76.
34. Id. at 78.
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which both parties were concededly deeply concerned, and about
which they had actively negotiated.
Another case cited in the Poet opinion, Vassar v. Camp,5 ap-
pears even more obviously inapposite. In that case, after oral nego-
tiations, the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff which stated in
passing that the defendant would recognize the contract when the
plaintiff's reply was received. The plaintiff's reply was lost in the
mail. When the plaintiff sued on the contract, the defense inter-
posed was that the defendant's reply provided that plaintiff's com-
munication was to have been effective when received, not when
posted. The court held that in order to avoid the operation of the
mailbox rule, the intent of the offeror-defendant must have been
more "explicitly" stated.3 Thus, the issue in Vassar was not vari-
ance, but the operation of the mailbox rule.
The Poet opinion also drew upon McCotter v. Mayor of New
York.5 In McCotter, the parties were negotiating for the purchase
by the city of land on Ward's Island in New York. The plaintiff
offered to sell his land on the island to the city, and the city re-
sponded that it accepted an offer to purchase all land on the island
not owned by the city at that time. The court correctly held that
there was no contract, because the parties never agreed to the
same thing: the plaintiff justifiably understood that he was selling
all land that he owned, which was less than all land not already
owned by the city on the island; and the defendant-city reasonably
understood that the offer was to sell all land on the island not al-
ready owned by the city. So considered, the basis of the McCotter
decision is distinguishable from the situation in Poet. In the Mc-
Cotter case, the variance involved the identity and quantity of the
subject matter of the transaction, a matter patently material and
important to the parties. This distinction is underscored by the re-
alization that in McCotter the variance in the proposed acceptance
may well have been caused by mistake on the part of the offeree.
Moreover, whatever the cause of the variance, the holding of the
court was expressly premised upon the finding that the intent in
fact of the defendant-offeree was to purchase all of the remaining
land." Thus, the result in the McCotter case did not turn upon a
35. 11 N.Y. 441 (1854).
36. Id. at 451.
37. 37 N.Y. 325 (1867).
38. Id. at 329. The court explained that, "it was the object of the City to purchase all
the lands on the island not owned by it. . . ." Id. Further, the court observed that-
[T]he negotiation therefore amounted to just this: the plaintiff offered to sell to the
1984 603
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court's presumption about the legal effect of a variance qua vari-
ance; instead, it rested upon the court's conclusion, supported by
all of the circumstances of the case, that there was a major, mate-
rial variance which consisted of different understandings of the of-
feror and offeree about the quantity and identity of the subject
matter.
Another case on which the Poel opinion relied upon was Barrow
v. Mexican Central Railway.3s The dispute in Barrow involved an
alleged contract by the defendant to supply passengers to the
plaintiff, a steamship line. The plaintiff's position was that the de-
fendant had agreed to supply a minimum of at least 250 passen-
gers. Although the trial court had directed a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, on appeal the majority reasoned that the principal is-
sue-the interpretation of the correspondence between the par-
ties-was a question of law for the court to resolve. The court held
that there was no contract. In reaching this conclusion, the court
examined at least six communications, and found numerous and
unequivocal expressions of doubt by both parties about the num-
ber of passengers.40 In seeking the meaning of the language used
by the parties, the court emphasized that its focus was upon the
"understanding"-the intent in fact - of the parties.4 It is no co-
incidence that the court closely examined expressions concerning
the number of passengers. The opinion explained that the rele-
vance of such an inquiry was that those expressions illustrated
party "expectations, an issue which the Barrow opinion treated
city of New York property which he at the time owned or controlled, and the city
replied by offering to purchase, not alone the lands offered, but other lands in addi-
tion thereto, so as to own the whole island.
Id.
39. 134 N.Y. 15, 31 N.E. 261 (1892).
40. The court pointed out that the defendant's agent, in a chain of communications to
plaintiff's agent, had made the following statements: "[The Mexican Central Railway] can
secure a party of about 175 to 200 people . . . there is a probability that there will be 250
people or more. . . there is a probability that the party will exceed 250, but I have not been
furnished with information as to the exact number. ... Id. at 21-22, 31 N.E. at 261-62.
41. Id. at 22, 31 N.E. at 263. This approach was far different from that in the Poel
case, where any variance constituted rejection. See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 26, 31 N.E. at 265. Moreover, in its concluding paragraph, the court stated
that, "Although the expectation founded upon the statement. . . may have led to prepara-
tions prejudicial to the plaintiff, it is not seen that defendant (assuming it acted in good
faith) is chargeable with the consequences." Id. Thus, although variances existed, and al-
though in fact plaintiff had a particular expectation, it was not justified. Aside from the
temptation to launch into analysis of this statement as an expression of an objective theory
of contract, its significance is plain-the actual understanding of the parties' controls. The
court refined this approach one step further by holding that the understanding must also be
Vol. 22:595
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as a factual matter. When it is recalled that both parties were in-
volved in the business of transporting passengers, it is only logical
to conclude, as the court did, that the number of passengers would
be important and material to both.43 Repeated expressions of
doubt by the defendant were consistent with the idea that the var-
iances as to quantity were not intended as definite commitments,
and should have been so understood by the plaintiff.
This approach was wholly different from the approach in Poel,
where a variance in phrasing was held to be material as a matter of
law, regardless of the intent of the parties. The analytical approach
followed by the court in Barrow was thus fundamentally different
from Poel. The objective of the Barrow court was to determine the
intent in fact, or actual understanding, of the parties, and the
court approached this issue as a question of fact, not a question of
law.
Hough v. Brown,44 the final case relied upon in the Poel opinion,
is also distinguishable. In Hough, the parties engaged in oral nego-
tiations for the transportation of freight. The plaintiff thereafter
directed a letter to the defendant which stated in pertinent part:
"We accept your proposition for our entire freight . . . .We in-
clude some nine or ten thousand hides. The price of freight is un-
derstood to be nine dollars through to New York, and ten dollars
through to Boston . . . .You will acknowledge the acceptance of
the above.' '4a The trial court charge permitted the jury to decide
whether an oral offer had been made to which this letter was an
acceptance, and under these instructions the jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff. The appellate court reversed an or-
dered a new trial on several grounds; first, it was not clear that an
oral offer had been made and even if such offer had been made,
interpretation of the writing was a question of law for the court;
second, the inclusion of the acknowledgement provision in the de-
fendant's reply constituted a rejection of any offer which might
reasonable and justified. It is submitted that this is a rather different theory from that
expressed in Poel, where the mere existence of the variance was alone conclusive.
43. 31 N.E. at 264-65. The court pointed out that the objective of the defendant in
this transaction was to secure passengers. The number of passengers, therefore, must have
been important to it, since the greater number of passengers transported on a given run for
which there were fixed costs, the greater the profit received from that run. The same reason-
ing was, of course, applicable to the plaintiff.
44. 19 N.Y. 111 (1859).
45. Id. at 112. Because of its apparent factual similarity to the communications held to




have been made; and finally the parties had not agreed upon the
quantity to be shipped. 46 Thus, the basis of the Hough decision
was ambiguous, for there were at least three, and possibly four,
alternative reasons given for the court's decision. The court also
particularly emphasized that the parties did not agree upon quan-
tity, because of the divergence upon that term between the oral
negotiations and the writings. This analysis reveals that Hough,
therefore, stood for the proposition that a failure to agree upon
quantity, an obviously important and material term, when coupled
with an acknowledgement clause constituted a fatal variance. In
addition, Poel is inconsistent with Hough since there was no vari-
ance over quantity in Poel.
The precedents examined immediately above which were relied
upon in the Poel case also failed to support the mechanical mirror
image approach to variance which that case adopted and pro-
moted. The Nundy, McCotter, Barrow and Hough cases all in-
volved failure to agree upon major, material terms. More impor-
tantly, those cases recognized that variance problems were not to
be resolved by recourse to a literal, technical comparison of the
writings involved, but through a determination of the actual un-
derstanding or intent of the parties. And, in several of those cases,
the court did not confine itself to examination of only the writ-
ings.4 7 It is clear that the courts' position, in those cases which
were not confined to the writings, was not that oral negotiations
could not be considered, for the courts themselves considered oral
negotiations.48 Of greater import was the evidence in Barrow and
Hough that there were indeed substantial, repeated and vigorously
expressed differences about material matters such as quantity.
These variances, considered in the context of the business in which
the parties were engaged and the type of transaction involved,
were patently material, and were so treated by the parties
themselves.
Thus, the Poel decision grossly distorted the holdings of these
earlier cases. In the earlier cases, the courts had treated the ques-
46. Id. at 113-15.
47. In both the Barrow and Hough cases the court considered testimony about prior
oral negotiations.
48. What probably occurred was that the appellate court was reluctant to permit a
jury to decide contract formation questions under a general charge: In most of these cases
juries had rendered verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs below. So considered, the emphasis
upon writing was a manifestation of distrust of the jury, and one cannot help but suspect
that the variance rule invoked in those cases as a mere "procedural" expedient selectively
used to control lay juries:
Vol. 22:595
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tion of whether a contract had been formed as a question of fact,
and in all of those cases, variances and disagreements as to major,
clearly material terms-usually quantity-had justified and sup-
ported the conclusion that no agreement and, hence, no contract
had been reached. Conversely, in Poel the intent of the parties as
objectively manifested was ignored, variances on any matter were
transformed into matters that per se revealed an intent not to con-
tract, and the generally understood and accepted approach to con-
tract formation, in which courts considered all relevant evidence of
intent as a question of fact, was apparently forced into a mold
which treated the question of contract formation as a matter of law
based only on writings.
C. The Mirror Image Doctrine Reexamined
The Poel holding was regrettable for the additional reason that
it was uncritically accepted by many pre-Code courts and commen-
tators. Although there were some cases decided prior to' and af-
ter"0 the Poel decision which followed its reasoning, there were
many other cases which did not. In these latter cases, the Poel ap-
proach was denied, ignored or replaced with a contradictory ap-
proach. Unfortunately, this other line of case authority has been
misdescribed or utterly ignored.
49. See, e.g., Knox v. McMurray, 159 Iowa 171, 140 N.W. 652 (1913) (even if the lan-
guage of purported acceptance appears to be a polite request, if it is different from the offer,
it is a fatal variance); Elks v. North State Life Ins. Co., 159 N.C. 619, 75 S.E. 808 (1912)(ele-
mentary that minds must meet exactly); Gates v. Dudgeon, 72 A.D. 562, 76 N.Y.S. 561
(1902)(offer and acceptance must be without qualification and match on precise terms);
Howells v. Stroock, 30 Misc. 569, 62 N.Y.S. 870 (1900)(exact meeting of minds required);
Myers v. Smith, 48 Barb. 614 (1867) (acceptance must be in words of offer); Chicago Rail-
way v. Dane, 43 N.Y. 240, (1870)(language of acceptance must be clear); Corcoran v. White,
117 Ill. 118, 7 N.E. 525 (1886) (acceptance must be unconditional); Egger v. Nesbitt, 122
Mo. 667, 27 S.W. 385 (1894)(any new proposition makes reply a counteroffer); Marschall v.
Eisen Vineyard Co., 7 Misc. 674, 28 N.Y.S. 62 (1894). These cases did not address the Stat-
ute of Frauds issue as had the earlier mentioned decisions. See supra notes 27-37 and ac-
companying text.
50. See, e.g., Minar v. Skoog, 235 Minn. 262, 50 N.W.2d 300 (1951)(exactitude is re-
quired in acceptance); Ajax Holding Co. v. Heinsbergen, 64 Cal. App. 2d 675, 149 P.2d 189
(1944) (acceptance must be unequivocal); Richardson v. Greensboro Warehouse & Storage
Co., 223 N.C. 344, 26 S.E.2d 897 (1943) (mutual intent in written documents governs);
United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1939) (acceptance must be unequivocal);
Friedman & Co. v. Newman, 255 N.Y. 340, 174 N.E. 703 (1931)(oral communications and
written ones must exactly match); El Reno Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Stocking, 293 Ill. 494,
127 N.E. 642 (1920) (writing with additional terms is no acceptance); Stanley v. Gannon, 109
Misc. 611, 180 N.Y.S. 602 (1919)(minds of parties must meet exactly on every term); Raisler
Heating Co. v. Clinton Wire Cloth Co., 168 N.Y.S. 668 (1918)(any difference is fatal
variance).
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It has been common knowledge among most lawyers that there
have been exceptions to the mirror image rule. One of these excep-
tions was rationalized under the rubric of "mere request" or "sug-
gestion," rather than conditional acceptance.5 1 Other cases recited
that a variant reply did not prevent formation of a contract if the
variance involved a "mere detail of performance" rather than a de-
tail of formation.52 But none of these cases explained how one is to
distinguish a detail of performance from a detail of formation. For
example, some cases involved a detail which had been left open in
the offer, which the courts held was cured by the acceptance. Thus,
the explanation of the courts was that there was no variance be-
cause indefinite terms were merely being clarified.53 Other cases
stated that no variance existed because the additional or variant
material in the reply was an "implied" factual or legal condition
contained in the offer.' Since the reply merely made explicit a
term of the offer, there was held to be no variance.
The labels and devices employed in these cases were misleading,
for they concealed a serious theoretical conflict. The courts,
through use of the labels, euphemisms, and circumlocutions de-
scribed above, maintained the appearance of consistency with the
mirror image rule. However, these benign mischaracterizations
concealed the fact that in many cases the courts employed a funda-
mentally different approach to the variance problem, one that was
theoretically and conceptually inconsistent with the Poel common
law perspective. That the true ratio decidendi of these cases is
fundamentally contradictory to the mirror image doctrine is appar-
ent from the most cursory examination.
For example, in Kreutzer v. Lynch,5 5 a case involving the sale of
real estate, the acceptance recited that title to the real estate was
to be perfect. The court held that this acceptance was a mere sug-
51. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 257 (1949) for an extensive collection of cases illustrating
this exception. See also Note, Contracts-Offer and Acceptance-Variation, 21 U. CIN. L.
REV. 68 (1952).
52. See Barnum v. Prescott, 86 W. Va. 173, 102 S.E. 860 (1920)(statement which dif-
fers from offer after offeree performs is mere detail of performance); Turner v. McCormick,
56 W. Va. 161, 49 S.E. 28 (1904)(mere request re performance). See also Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d
257, 258-60 (1949).
53. See Propstra v. Dyer, 189 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1951)(actions of parties show addi-
tional material in acceptance was mere clarification); Kreutzer v. Lynch, 122 Wisc. 474, 100
N.W. 887 (1904) (actions show mere suggestion intended).
54. See Valashinas v. Koniuto, 308 N.Y. 233, 124 N.E.2d 300 (1954)(writings and ac-
tions show condition implied); Morse v. Tillotson, 253 F. 340 (2d Cir. 1918)(acceptance con-
ditioned on what law implies is valid). See also Annot., 1 A.L.R. 1508 (1919).
55. 122 Wisc. 474, 100 N.W. 887 (1904).
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gestion, and was not conditional. The rationale for that holding
was that the variance was "intended" by the offeree and "under-
stood" by the offeror not to be conditional.56 It is significant that
the court based this conclusion upon an oral conversation between
the parties which had occurred prior to the writings. 57 Thus, the
holding was based upon the understanding of the parties, gathered
from all sources, oral and written.
The court adopted a similar test in Rucker v. Sanders.5 8 There
the offeree in his purported acceptance provided for payment of
the purchase price of stocks at a place different from the place of
delivery. The court held that the test for a fatal variance was
whether the additional term was "intended and understood" by
the parties to be a condition and added that "we must give effect
to the most essential and controlling element of all executory con-
tracts, to wit, the real understanding and intention of the par-
ties.' 9 In the Rucker decision, the variation in the acceptance did
not prevent formation of the contract because it was a mere sug-
gestion; and was held to be a mere suggestion because of the actual
understanding-the intent in fact-of the parties.
Similarly, in First National Exchange Bank of Roanoke v. Roa-
noke Oil Co.60 the court, basing its finding upon numerous meet-
ings, conversations, and writings between the parties, held that an
option to purchase had been exercised in spite of additional terms
in the acceptance, because the parties intended and understood
that it had been exercised. The intent of the parties prevailed over
what was concededly a variance in the writings exchanged.6 1 And,
in Johnson v. Federal Union Surety Co.,62 the court squarely held
that variance problems are controlled and resolved by recourse to
the intent of the parties, and that intent is to be sought in all of
the communications and acts of the parties.6 3 Thus, these four
cases employed an approach to variance which was fundamentally
different from the approach in the Poel opinion, but concealed the
56. Id. at 475, 100 N.W. at 888.
57. Id.
58. 182 N.C. 607, 109 S.E. 857 (1921).
59. Id. at 608, 109 S.E. at 858 (emphasis added).
60. 169 Va. 99, 192 S.E. 764 (1937).
61. See also Matteson v. Scofield, 27 Wisc. 671 (1871) for an identical holding.
62. 187 Mich. 454, 153 N.W. 788 (1915). See also Elks v. North State Life Ins. Co., 159
N.C. 619, 75 S.E. 808 (1912), where the court stated that it was "quite clear" that the ques-
tion of whether a variance prevents contract formation is a question of intent. Id. at 621, 75
S.E. at 810.
63. 187 Mich. at 458, 153 N.W. at 792.
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differences under the label "mere suggestion."
A closely related approach emphasized the intent of the offeree.
One typical case in this group, Barnum v. Prescott," held that ad-
ditional terms in a reply which the offeree intended as possible ac-
commodations to the offeror, but which recognized a contract, was
not a fatal variance. In another case, the court held that the of-
feree's intent to remain flexible as to date of performance, gath-
ered from all communications between the parties, prevented a va-
riance in the acceptance from precluding formation of a contract."
The most important of these cases, Turner v. McCormick," in-
volved a dispute over whether the requirements for an abstract of
title to mineral rights in a purported acceptance was a fatal vari-
ance. The court held that the addition was a mere request for a
change, and explained that "when a man has deliberately made a
firm contract of sale, he ought not to be permitted to avoid it on
some flimsy pretext in order to avail himself of a better bargain.
'1
"7
A clearer statement that the actual intent of the offeree controls
can hardly be imagined. In fact, the court's conclusion was that the
offeree intended to accept, and the understanding of the offeror
was that there was a contract in spite of any variance. The offeree's
actual intent, as manifested by his words and actions at the opera-
tionally significant time, before he discovered a better bargain, pre-
vailed over a later attempt to invoke the mirror image rule after he
had changed his mind.
Several other cases described as falling within this "narrow ex-
ception" evolved the concept of immaterial variance. In Foster v.
West Publishing Co.,68 the court construed an equivocal response
as an acceptance because a bona fide intent to contract was shown.
The court reasoned that immaterial or collateral variances must be
disregarded in deciding whether a contract exists, but that the
question of what is or is not material is to be resolved according to
64. 86 W. Va. 173, 102 S.E. 860 (1920).
65. See Valashinas v. Koniuto, 308 N.Y. 233, 124 N.E.2d 300 (1954).
66. 56 W. Va. 161, 49 S.E. 28 (1904).
67. 56 W. Va. at 171, 49 S.E. at 32. The court also explained its holding on the basis
that the variance involved a mere detail of performance, and added that in the allegedly
variant acceptance, words of acceptance preceded the new material. "The request ... for
modification of the offer made before its acceptance might well have been regarded as an
indication of a purpose not to accept. Here the acceptance precedes the request for a modifi-
cation." 56 W. Va. at 167-68, 49 S.E. at 31. This particular rule of construction is arbitrary.
The issue was not whether the new term was read by the offeror before or after other lan-
guage of acceptance; rather, the issue was whether the additional term conditioned the ac-
ceptance whenever it appeared on the offeree's form.
68. 77 Okla. 114, 186 P. 1083 (1920).
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the intent of the parties. 9
This principle of immaterial variance appears to have been car-
ried even further in Farmers Produce v. McAlester.7 ° In that case,
the offeree's response contained a provision that it needed time to
fill any order. The court held that a contract existed. Of signifi-
cance was the court's explicit recognition that the reply did vary
the offer, and its conclusion that the variance was nonetheless im-
material. The court reasoned that "[an offer of sale . . . and its
acceptance must receive a reasonable construction . . . . Immate-
rial variances between the offer and its acceptance will be disre-
garded. 7 1 The variance was not viewed as material because the
offeror did not treat it as such and the actual intent of the offeror,
as disclosed by all of his acts, controlled. This approach is precisely
the opposite from that of the Poel line of cases where the mere
existence of a variance was automatically fatal and the courts re-
fused to acknowledge that any construction of the writings was
permitted.
Describing these cases as "minor" or "narrow" exceptions to the
mirror image doctrine, or as somehow consistent with that rule, is
simply wrong. These cases fundamentally contradict the Poel ap-
proach in several important ways. First, the principle which most
effectively explains the outcome in those cases is that party intent,
objectively manifested, controlled the question of whether variance
in a reply to an offer prevented formation of a contract. In most of
these "exceptional" cases, the courts examined all of the circum-
stances and communications involved. These factors included oral
and written communications, the nature of the transaction, the
subject matter of the transaction in general, the subject of the vari-
ance, and the other actions of the parties. The Poel mirror image
approach, on the other hand, looked only to the writings and pre-
sumed the absence of intent from any variance. Thus, these "mi-
nor exception" cases fundamentally contradicted Poel by treating
the question of intent to contract as a dispositive issue of fact to
be gathered from all the circumstances. The label "mere sugges-
69. 77 Okla. at 116, 186 P. at 1084. The court explained that:
[1]f a bona fide intent on both sides to come to a definite agreement is shown, it
should be so construed, if possible, as to constitute an agreement rather than to de-
feat one. [Here a] reasonable construction . . . is to say there appears a bona fide
intent on both sides to come to a definite agreement.
Id.
70. 48 Okla. 488, 150 P. 483 (1915).
71. 48 Okla. at 490, 150 P. at 485.
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tion" or "mere detail of performance" and the other labels em-
ployed as part of the exceptions expressed or conveyed the court's
conclusion that the parties intended to contract in spite of vari-
ances. But the process of examining all of the circumstances to
find the actual, objectively manifested intent, even though a vari-
ance had occurred, was wholly alien to the Poel mirror image ap-
proach. Although it is clear that these cases employed a wholly dif-
ferent approach to the variance problem, courts and commentators
incorrectly described these cases as involving narrow, almost negli-
gible, exceptions. This approach obscured the true nature of the
theoretical conflict in this area.
One may well ask why the contradiction between these two ap-
proaches to the variance problem was ignored or denied. There ap-
pear to be some persuasive answers. The mirror image rule was
conceptually simple and apparently easy to apply. These attributes
may have made it attractive to busy decision-makers. Another pos-
sible explanation may well have been the desire for symmetry in
the law. Once the courts perceived the usefulness of the mirror im-
age doctrine in rationalizing the results in close or difficult cases, it
was unlikely that many of them would be inclined to adopt what
was admittedly a contradictory theory to be used in essentially
similar cases. Instead, deviations from the mirror image rule were
described as narrow exceptions, aberrations, or (fictionally) as con-
sistent with the mirror image rule.
III. THE LAST SHOT DOCTRINE REEXAMINED
The so-called "last shot" rule was a corollary to, and companion
of, the Poel approach to variance, which later writers also misde-
scribed. The standard version of the last shot doctrine provided
that any variance in a purported acceptance converted it to a
counter-offer, and any act relative to the subject matter of the
transaction performed by the recipient of the variant acceptance/
counter-offer would constitute an acceptance of the counter-offer
and all of its terms.72 Hence, the title "last shot" because the of-
feree had sent the last communication; that is, he fired the last
shot in the battle of the forms, and thus the contract was on his
terms.
7 3
This rule was uncritically followed in numerous decisions after




the Poel case.7' In most cases involving variance, the courts ap-
plied the last shot rule in a mechanical fashion. If the purported
written acceptance contained any variance, and the recipient sub-
sequently performed any act relative to the subject of the contract,
then, even if he did not and should or could not have known of the
change, the contract was held to include all of the terms of the
variance.7 5 It was this aspect of the last shot rule which later com-
mentators described and emphasized. This emphasis was mislead-
ing, for the fact of the matter was that in many variance situations,
opinion writers either expressly refused to apply the last shot rule
or else they circumvented it through a variety of fictions and other
manipulative devices.
In Everett v. Emmons Coal Mining Co., 76 a typical last shot
case, the vendor and vendee sent order forms to each other after
oral negotiations and an exchange of detailed telegrams had oc-
curred. Vendee's form recited that it contained the "final" agree-
ment of the parties and that it should be returned at once if the
vendor did not agree that it did not accurately describe the under-
standing of the parties.77 The vendor's form, which was last to ar-
rive, provided that it was subject to conditions on the back of the
form. One of these boiler plate conditions was a clause excusing
delay in performance.7 8 Vendee accepted delivery of several con-
forming loads of coal, but refused subsequent deliveries made after
the performance dates stipulated in vendee's order form. The court
held that the contract between the parties consisted of the provi-
sions of the vendor's forms, which included the excuse clause. Al-
74. See, e.g., Shpetner v. Hollywood Clothing, 42 A.2d 522 (1945)(receipt of partial
order is acceptance); Onyx Oil v. Steinberg, 180 Misc. 315, 44 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1943) (slight
action with knowledge after change is acceptance of counter-offer); Aluminum Products v.
Regal, 296 Mass. 84, 4 N.E.2d 1003 (1936)(receipt of delivery and bill which contradicted
offer was acceptance of counter-offer); Riverside Coal v. Elman Coal, 114 Conn. 492, 159 A.
280 (1932)(additional terms followed by action constituted acceptance of counter-offer);
Johnson v. O'Neill, 182 Minn. 232, 234 N.W. 16 (1931)(change and performance are accept-
ance of changed terms); Hartwell v. Crane, 209 Ill. App. 399 (1918)(lower price in response
to offer followed by shipment is acceptance of lower price); Caldwell Bros. & Co. v. Coast
Coal Co., 58 Wash. 461, 108 P. 1075 (1910)(action after change in destination was accept-
ance); Sneed & Co. Iron-Works v. Douglas, 49 Ark. 355, 5 S.W. 585 (1887)(action by original
offeror after change/counter-offer was acceptance of counter offer).
75. See, e.g., Onyx Oils v. Steinberg, 180 Misc. 315, 44 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1943); Vaughan's
Seed Store v. Morris April & Bros., 123 N.J.L. 26, 7 A.2d 868 (1939); Caldwell Bros. & Co. v.
Coast Coal Co., 58 Wash. 461, 108 P. 1075 (1910).
76. 289 F. 686 (6th Cir. 1923). See also White Oak Coal Co. v. Squier Co., 219 S.W.
693 (Mo. App. 1920).
77. 289 F. at 689-90.
78. Id.
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though the telegrams were quite detailed, they did not result in a
contract because there was a minor variance in one of them. Ven-
dee's form order, which had been dispatched after the exchange of
telegrams did not form a contract by itself, according to the court,
because it stipulated that it superseded prior communications.79
Since the vendee received this variant acceptance form and later
took delivery of several conforming shipments, a contract was
formed upon the terms of vendor's form.80
The opinion is questionable for several reasons. First, the court's
explanation suffered from a major inconsistency which may have
been created by the last shot rule. On the one hand, the court
stated that the contract terms were controlled and provided by the
vendee's and vendor's forms. On the other hand, the court held
that the terms of the contract between the parties included only
the terms in the vendor's form. In spite of the language in the
opinion which suggested that the vendee's intent or understanding
of the deal between the parties was part of the contract terms, it is
clear that on the specific matter at issue, excuse for delay in per-
formance, the vendor's form and intent controlled. Moreover, the
court's description of the vendor's form as the acceptance was sim-
ply inaccurate. What the court in fact decided was that the ven-
dor's form was a counter-offer under the last shot rule, and that
counter-offer was accepted by the vendee's receipt of several deliv-
eries. This inconsistency is, however, the least serious criticism
which can be made about the Emmons opinion.
At a more fundamental level, the decision clearly illustrates the
unfairness which can result from a rigid application of the last shot
rule. As a result of the oral negotiations and telegrams, it would
appear quite likely that the parties understood that they had
agreed upon terms which did not include the exculpation clause.
Nevertheless, the vendor's form, including the clause which had
not been discussed, was held to control. In effect, the vendee was
held to be subject to an absolute duty to read and to understand
every term on every form which he received. Putting aside the
question of what the duty to read generally is or ought to be,8 the
reasoning in the opinion poses the question of what the duty to
79. Id. The court concluded that "[t]he undisputed facts make it clear . . . that the
only contract between the parties was constituted by [vendee's] order . . . and [vendor's]
acceptance .... " Id. at 689.
80. Id.
81. For a discussion concerning the duty to read, see CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS
§§ 9-41 to 9-46 (2d ed. 1977).
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read and understand should be in these specific circumstances.
When parties have reached agreement orally (or in the telegrams
exchanged) upon every major term of the proposed transaction,
there should surely be some diminution of the absolute duty to
read. In the Emmons case, since prior agreement on major terms
was clear, and since the vendee also stated in his order form that
he was accurately reducing that agreement to writing and wished
to be notified if he was inaccurate, this conclusion would appear to
be especially appropriate. The only notice of changed or additional
terms which the vendor gave was boiler plate on the back of his
form. It is difficult to perceive how it can tenably be argued that
this type of response would or should have been understood by the
vendee, even if it were reasonably read by him, as notice of rejec-
tion or as the notice requested by vendee in his form.
This analysis assists in defining one of the most serious problems
inherent in the last shot approach. Where parties agree on all ma-
jor terms either orally or by informal, non-form written communi-
cations, and when they understand that they have reached agree-
ment, new or different terms in a subsequent form should not
become part of their contract as a matter of course. Unfortunately,
the last shot rule usually led to this inequitable result.82 One basic
objective of Anglo-American courts in cases involving formation of
contracts concededly has been, and is, to identify the mutual in-
tent or understanding of the parties, objectively determined; this
goal is usually achieved by treating it as a question of fact. Cases
such as Emmons demonstrate that the last shot rule is inconsistent
with this objective.
It may be objected that this criticism of the last shot rule is
based upon a return to a subjective theory of contracts. An oppo-
nent to this position would argue that the basis of this approach is
the determination of whether the recipient of the acceptance in
fact saw the variant term; if he did not, then his actual under-
standing and the prior agreement between the parties, exclusive of
the new or different terms, controls. To permit the actual "inner"
understanding of the offeror to control, it would be argued, is to
adopt a purely subjective theory of contracts. A proponent of this
position would argue that it is expressions of assent, not inward
states of mind, which are determinative." The controlling princi-
ple should be the effect of the outward manifestations or acts of
82. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
83. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 81, at § 2-2; CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 9 (1952).
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the vendor (such as taking delivery) as calculated ih light of his
duty to read. Thus, the approach which is being argued here is
fully consistent with an objective theory of contracts.
Applied to the Emmons facts, the simple analysis under this ob-
jective theory would be as follows. The vendee understood that
there was a contract which included the terms agreed upon before
the exchange of forms and, as a reasonable man, he was justified in
that understanding. In such a situation, he should not be required
to observe and understand all of the fine print boiler plate on the
back of forms which he later receives. In these circumstances, the
vendee's belief is reasonably justified, and he is entitled to rely
upon what has been fairly agreed upon between the parties. In
other words, it is no more reasonable to conclude that a subse-
quent writing of the vendor controls than it is to conclude that the
reasonable, justified understanding of the vendee controls, but it is
certainly more unfair to do So.8 4 In the latter situation, the under-
standing of both parties is the basis of the contract, for it consists
of what they actually agreed upon. In the former, the terms and
hence purposes of one party, the vendor, controls even though he
knows or should know that the other party does not agree. Thus,
the standard last shot rule is arbitarary and unfair. It imposes an
unnatural and unrealistic standard of behavior on businessmen,
who often deal in large volumes of transactions, in that they are
required to read like a lawyer every clause of every form which
they receive, and to locate and understand which of those terms
are additions to, or contradict, the terms upon which the deal was
agreed. The unfairness of imposition of this lawyers' standard is
emphasized by the context in which it occurs. When parties have
agreed and even exchanged informal writings, surely there should
be some relaxation of the absolute duty to read and understand
subsequent forms, for it is only natural for parties to lower their
guard after they have reached agreement orally and/or in informal
writings. This unfortunate failure or refusal to give effect to the
mutual intent of the parties-a basic goal of Anglo-American con-
84. Although directed to a problem described under a different label, Karl Llewellyn
suggested a similar analysis of the problems involving "boiler plate":
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so
far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented
to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and
but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to
any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not
alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370-71 (1960).
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tract law-occurs without even a persuasive explanation or men-
tion of alternative values or objectives served by the last shot rule.
Nor is the Emmons case an isolated example of the inequity of
the doctrine. In White Oak Coal Co. v. Squier Co., 85 the vendee
ordered a fixed quantity of "5 x 2 bar-screened large egg coal" in a
written order form. 86 The vendor's acknowledgement form con-
tained an exculpatory clause which permitted vendor to prorate or-
ders for that grade and type of coal if demand outstripped his sup-
ply. After receiving this acknowledgement, the vendee wrote to the
vendor to emphasize that all coal shipped had to be of the grade
and type specified in vendee's form, namely "5 x 2 bar-screened
large egg New River coal. ' 87 After several conforming shipments,
the vendor shipped a different type of coal, which vendee refused
to accept.
After vendor filed suit for breach, the court held in favor of the
vendor on the theory that the contract between the parties was on
the vendor's terms, because vendee had accepted several carloads
after receipt of the variant acknowledgement form.88 The acknowl-
edgement was considered to be a counter-offer, which vendee ac-
cepted when he took delivery of coal. The holding is a classic ex-
ample of the standard last shot rule. The court conceded that both
parties "clearly" understood that the contract "required" coal of
the grade specified in vendee's form, and the court also agreed that
the vendee after receipt of the variant acknowledgement had "em-
phasized" (e.g., objected) in writing that the coal had to be of the
quantity and quality specified by vendee in his forms.89 Thus, ven-
dor actually understood, as a result of vendee's specific written ob-
jection, that his additional term was not acceptable. It is difficult
to understand how or why that term, which was either expressly
rejected or rejected by plain and necessary implication, could be-
come part of the contract.
The injustice of the result which the last shot doctrine produced
in White Oak Coal is clear, but the case is disturbing for another
reason. The court did not even correctly apply the last shot doc-
trine as it was then understood by its followers. Instead, the analy-
sis should have been as follows: First, the exculpatory clause of
vendor's acknowledgement form involved a variance as to quantity
85. 219 S.W. 693 (Mo. App. 1920).
86. Id. at 695, 697.
87. Id. at 696.




and quality terms, and the communication was, therefore, a
counter-offer. Vendee's subsequent written insistence that all coal
supplies had to conform to vendee's terms was a rejection of ven-
dor's counter-offer, and this objection was, in turn, another offer
made by vendee to contract on the vendee's terms. After vendee
made this return counteroffer, shipment by the vendor of several
shipments which conformed to the terms insisted upon by the ven-
dee was an acceptance of vendee's counter-offer and all of its
terms.90
The incorrect analysis of the court in White Oak Coal illustrates
several commonly occurring problems with the last shot doctrine
as applied. First, the rule was misleading. In spite of the appar-
ently simple and absolute nature of the rule, it was not self-apply-
ing or self-executing in the sense that there could be only one obvi-
ous analysis and result whenever it was employed. Exactly the
opposite was commonly true in most variance situations. There
were numerous written forms and oral communications as well as
numerous acts by both parties relative to the subject matter, many
of which could be characterized as the last shot and the accept-
ance. Often under the last shot approach characterization of sev-
eral different writings as the last shot was equally plausible and
tenable, but each choice of a writing as the last shot pointed to a
different outcome for the case. Thus, cases like White Oak Coal
demonstrate that the apparent certainty and simplicity of the last
shot rule was illusory. In many last shot situations, the courts
made a choice among several competing characterizations of the
variant communications and acts of the parties, but the only expla-
nation which they gave for the choice made was a recitation of the
last shot rule. Since the rule could have been applied to several
communications or acts this rationale was practically useless, be-
cause it did not explain why the particular communication which
was selected by the court and characterized as the last shot had
been chosen to prevail over other equally plausible competing
90. This alternative analysis would appear to be more consistent with the last shot
rule. The standard mirror image rule, it will be remembered, provided that the slightest
variance in a purported acceptance converted it to a counter-offer. Hence, vendor's acknowl-
edgement was a counter-offer. Application of this same principle leads to the conclusion
that vendee's subsequent letter was by its terms another counter offer because it varied the
previous counter-offer by insisting upon the original quantity and quality of coal. The stan-
dard last shot rule provided that any act relative to the subject matter following the latest
counter-offer was an acceptance of that counter-offer; thus, vendor's subsequent delivery of





This description illustrates that the doctrine operated through a
process of characterization, or labelling, of a writing as the last
shot.9' Characterization, a form of legal taxonomy, places the ac-
tion or thing at issue into a particular "pigeon hole" or category,
and that choice is usually outcome-determinative. Once a particu-
lar classification has been selected, there is usually only one result
which a decisionmaker can thereafter logically attain. Applied to
the typical variance case, this type of reasoning required that, as
soon as a writing had been chosen as the last shot, then any act by
the recipient would cause a decisionmaker to conclude that the
contract between the parties included all of the terms of the last
shot communication.
This characterization feature probably accounted for the popu-
larity of the last shot doctrine. Faced with a factually complex
case, as often occurred in the variance situation, a decisionmaker
could review the writings, select one as the last shot, and then
reach a decision by an apparently simple process of deductive rea-
soning. But it is obvious that the characterization process it-
self-the actual selection of the controlling writing as the last
shot-was done intuitively, and it must be emphasized that this
choice was outcome-determinative. The intuitive nature of the pro-
cess meant that in variance situations characterization of a writing
as the last shot often or usually occurred without much thought
about, or examination of, competing alternative characterizations
of other writings as the last shot, and this initial choice, once
made, inexorably determined- the outcome in a particular case.
Thus, the intuitive nature of the characterization device, coupled
with the fact that it was usually dispositive of the case, led to a
result which had been reached without any real thought or
analysis.
The characterization feature of the last shot doctrine was, there-
fore, subject to two serious criticisms. First, it was flawed in the
same sense that any doctrine or rule which prevents or discourages
accurate explanation for judicial decisions is flawed. The decisions
which employed the doctrine where obscure and misleading, and
they appeared to be arbitrary. Even a cursory review of the cases
involving application of the doctrine reveals that different
91. For a more extensive discussion and description of the characterization device in a
different context, see Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L. J.
333 (1933); WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 333.1-.2C2 (2d ed. 1980).
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courts-or even the same court at different times-reached appar-
ently inconsistent or contradictory decisions in cases involving sub-
stantially similar or even identical facts.2 Thus, the last shot rule
had little value as a predictive tool.93
The second flaw of the characterization device was far more seri-
ous. The intuitive nature of characterization and its usual out-
come-producing effect meant that the decisionmakers themselves
did not examine the reasons for their characterizations of writings
as the last shot. They did not think about, nor did they analyze the
basis for the last shot rule and whether it achieved just or equita-
ble results, or whether there were better or alternative approaches.
Singly, each of these effects was serious, but cumulatively, they
were disastrous. The last shot doctrine caused a fundamental dislo-
cation of several of the basic objectives of the American system of
contract law. The judicial thinking which it promoted caused deci-
sionmakers to decide cases in a fashion which was inconsistent
with acknowledged basic general values of the contract formation
process. One fundamental feature of Anglo-American contract law
is that it is consensual and, indeed, it is this feature which, for
example, is often used in attempts to define a contract, and to dis-
tinguish the basis for contractual liability from other types of lia-
bility.9 4 In cases involving problems of contract formation and in-
terpretation, the courts have generally implemented this objective
by focusing upon mutual assent through a standard which involves
identification of the mutual intent of the parties to strike a bar-
gain.9 5 The last shot doctrine as it was applied by most courts to-
tally ignored or contradicted these objectives. In addition, the body
of law which the courts fashioned was self-contradictory.
These unfortunate consequences were strikingly illustrated by
decisions like the White Oak Coal case.96 There, the court con-
ceded that not only did the parties understand that a fixed quanti-
ty and quality of coal had been agreed upon,9 7 but it also expressed
recognition that vendee "did not" agree to the exculpatory terms
92. Compare, e.g., Moorehead v. Minnesota Seed Co., 139 Minn. 11, 165 N.W. 484
(1917) with Vaughn's Seed Store v. Morris, 123 N.J.L. 26, 7 A.2d 868 (1939).
93. After reading the cases, one was left with the impression that it was impossible to
foresee how the rule would be applied in a particular case. While the content of the last shot
doctrine was simple and clear, its application varied from case to case.
94. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 81, at § 2-1.
95. Id. See also MURRAY, supra note 72, at 28-29.
96. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
97. The court stated, "It quite clearly appears, we think, that both parties understood
that the order required 5x2 bar-screened large egg coal." 219 S.W. at 697 (emphasis added).
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in vendor's acknowledgement form."s It is clear that the last shot
doctrine employed by the court defeated or prevented giving effect
to the concededly mutual understanding of the parties, so that the
vendor's terms controlled even through vendee had objected to it.
The flaws which have been observed in connection with the Em-
monsee and White Oak Coal cases were frequently seen in other
variance decisions, although the normal course was for courts to
apply the last shot rule without any explanation. The decisions
simply held that a contract was formed on the basis of the last
form received, regardless of what the parties knew or should have
known, and regardless of what they said. 00 The choice facing the
recipient was that he could only accept on the terms of the
counteroffer or reject it. 10' Even acceptance of a partial shipment
was acceptance of the entire counter-offer. 10 2 This "all or nothing"
characteristic was another questionable feature of the last shot
rule. If, for example, the recipient of a variant communication rea-
sonably did not see the new or different term or did not under-
stand or appreciate its effect, and the goods he accepted complied
with the contract terms as he understood the parties had agreed,
the factual inference that could be drawn from his actions is equiv-
ocal at best. If he justifiably did not see nor comprehend the addi-
tional terms in the variant form which he received, it is difficult to
understand how his act can be construed to constitute consent to
the other party's terms, or how he should be forced to accept the
other party's terms. This aspect of the last shot rule created a pre-
sumption of acceptance of the variant term or terms regardless of
party intent. This presumption, an integral part of the operation of
the last shot rule, is one of its most significant and objectionable
features.
98. Id. at 697.
99. 289 F. 686 (6th Cir. 1923). See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
100. See Riverside Coal Co. v. Elman Coal Co., 114 Conn. 492, 159 A. 280 (1932)(addi-
tional terms in confirmation); Johnson v. O'Neill, 182 Minn. 232, 234 N.W. 16 (1931)(change
in written specifications followed by action and oral questions was acceptance of change in
specifications); Midland Bank v. Security Co., 161 Minn. 30, 200 N.W. 851 (1924)(action
without notice was sufficient acceptance); Hankins v. Young, 174 Iowa 383, 156 N.W. 380
(1916)(last writing controls).
101. See Aluminum Products Co. v. Regal Apparel, 296 Mass. 84, 4 N.E.2d 1003
(1936)(offeree cannot receive and retain goods except on terms of counter-offer); Johnson v.
O'Neill, 182 Minn. 232, 234 N.W. 16 (1931)(only choice of offeree is to accept or reject
counter-offer); Sneed v. Douglas, 49 Ark. 355, 5 S.W. 585 (1887)(option to either accept or
reject).
102. See Shpetner v. Hollywood Credit Co., 42 A.2d 522 (D.C. 1945) and Caldwell v.
Coast Coal, 58 Wash. 461, 108 P. 1075 (1910).
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Under our system of contract law with its emphasis upon assent,
the conclusion that an acceptance has occurred should not rest
upon a presumption. Acceptance-and the last shot rule is only a
label to describe manner of acceptance in a particular situa-
tion-involves a finding that express or implied assent has been
given. The last shot doctrine involves implication of assent from an
act or acts. That is, the presumption is suspect, for how fairly can
it be concluded that the recipient of a variant communication in-
tended to accept or should be held to have intended to accept vari-
ants terms where he had done nothing more than accept goods
which conformed to his own justified understanding of the bargain
between the parties. It is here that the harm caused by the cryptic,
ritual invocation of the last shot doctrine becomes apparent. Be-
cause the courts did not explain nor analyze the last shot rule,
their attention was directed away from the basic principle of con-
tract formation that a process of implication from an act was in-
volved in the variance area. They did not perceive that they had
created a presumption nor did they inquire either generally or with
respect to particular cases before them whether the presumption
was justified. Thus, under the last shot regime, any act,10 no mat-
ter how innocuous, resulted in a presumption of acceptance. Be-
cause this presumption was outside the experience and expecta-
tions of the normal businessman or other layman, and because it
was not in accord with the basic goals of the general Anglo-Ameri-
can law of contract formation, it was grossly unjust.
These were not the only problems with the last shot rule, as is
illustrated by Alaska Pacific Salmon v. Reynolds Metals."°4 In
that case, after extensive oral negotiations and exchanges of vari-
ous writings relative to the purchase of aluminum containers, the
vendee sent a form order to the vendor. Vendor replied with an
acknowledgement form which included a warranty disclaimer.
Shortly thereafter, the vendor wrote a detailed letter to vendee
which provided the results of various tests of the quality of the
containers for the proposed use, and which also assured vendee
that the containers were suitable for that use. The containers were,
in fact, defective, and vendee filed an action to recover for breach
of warranty.
The trial court instructed the jury that the vendor's acknowl-
edgement form was a counter-offer, and, if it was accepted by the
103. See, e.g., BlaisdeU v. Bayard, 311 Pa. 6, 166 A. 234 (1933).
104. 163 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1947).
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vendee, the contract between the parties was on the terms of the
acknowledgement. 105 The jury's verdict in favor of the vendor was
affirmed by the Second Circuit, whose opinion emphasized the
clarity of the disclaimer language. However, there were several se-
rious deficiencies in this analysis. One problem was that the appel-
late court assumed that the acknowledgement form alone was a
counter-offer, and, thus, focused jury attention principally upon
the subsequent conduct of the vendee. In view of the continuing
communications between the parties after the forms had been ex-
changed, the assumption or suggestion that the vendor's form
alone constituted a statement of the terms of the contract between
the parties hardly seems either accurate or fair. The continuing
communications between the parties may well have indicated that
the parties had not reached agreement, at leasts on quality terms.
The subsequent quality assurance letter which vendor sent to ven-
dee furnished persuasive support for this conclusion.
This analysis illustrates another harmful tendency of the last
shot rule. The rule as employed in the Alaska case encouraged
courts and juries- to ignore the content of oral and written commu-
nication between the parties except for the last shot communica-
tion. In this case, assurance of quality and suitability of the con-
tainers made by the vendor both before and after he sent his
acknowledgement form were ignored. The automatic preference,
bias, or emphasis in favor of the last form directed attention away
from what should have been the principal inquiry, a determination
of the understanding or intent of the parties. Finally, the law and
how it should have been applied was confusing and wholly
unpredictable. 106
A. The Counter Current: Direct Refusals to Apply the Last
Shot Principle to Variance Problems
Many jurists were aware of the potential for unfairness created
by the last shot rule. In numerous decisions courts avoided apply-
ing the rule directly or indirectly through a variety of devices.
105. Id. at 652. The court held that "This acknowledgement [of vendor] with its new
conditions constituted a counter-offer by the defendant [vendor] which required an accept-
ance by the plaintiff to make it effective . . . .(A]cceptance may be inferred . . . from the
plaintiff's conduct .... ." Id.
106. See Memorandum of Karl N. Llewellyn to the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion Hearings on Adoption of the U.C.C., Bound Vol. 1, 56 (1954) in which Llewellyn com-
mented, "[tihe intricacy and confusion involved in even a fairly simple typical [last shot]
case . .. appears in [the] Alaska Pacific Salmon [ease] .... The law is uncertain." Id.
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Some decisions expressly refused to employ the last shot rule.
These decisions began their analysis by recognizing that the last
shot rule was an exception to the more general rule that silence
alone cannot constitute acceptance,0 7 and that silence, coupled
with an act by the recipient of the variant form, is required before
it is possible to justifiably conclude that there is an intent to ac-
cept.10 8 Even this general rule was understood to be subject to ex-
ception in several situations. 10 9 For example, if the purported ac-
ceptance contained a variance, then even though the offeror
remained silent, he would be held to have assented to a contract if
he remained silent but actually intended to accept on the terms of
the variant acceptance."10 Also, if the court concluded that the re-
cipient of the variant acceptance had a duty to reply, his silence
might constitute an acceptance."' Such a duty to reply might oc-
cur when the sender of the variant communication was justified in
expecting a reply in case of disagreement, that is, when the offeror
contributed in some way to the justified impression of the sender
that he would so indicate if he did not accept."' Thus, in some
cases where in past dealings silence had been understood by the
parties to constitute acceptance, courts concluded that such a duty
to reply arose, and that silence did constitute acceptance."13 It is
important to note that review of these cases is not meant to spell
out all of the details of the venerable old rule that silence cannot
constitute acceptance"" and the exceptions to that rule. Rather, it
107. See, e.g., Marshall Mfg. v. Berrien, 269 Mich. 337, 257 N.W. 714 (1934) (accept-
ance of counter-offer is by act, not by silence); Baum's Estate, 274 Pa. 283, 117 A. 684
(1922)(silence alone not assent); Russell v. Falls Mfg. Co., 106 Wis. 329, 82 N.W. 134 (1900)
(silence alone not acceptance).
108. See, e.g., Todorovich v. Kinickinnic, 238 Wis. 39, 298 N.W. 226 (1941)(acceptance
must be inferred from conduct); Drucker v. Oppenheim, 165 N.Y.S. 289 (1917)(silent reten-
tion of counter-offer not acceptance unless coupled with act); Columbia Malting Co. v. Clau-
sen, 3 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1924)(silence not acceptance unless there is duty to speak; act is
acceptance).
109. See generally FARNSWORTH, CoNTACrs, CASES AND MATERIALS 211-14 (3d ed.
1979).
110. See, e.g., Cincinnati Equip. Co. v. Big Muddy Coal Co., 158 Ky. 247, 164 S.W. 794
(1914).
111. See, e.g., Wood v. Gunther, 89 Cal. App.2d 718, 201 P.2d 874 (1949).
112. See, e.g., Laredo Nat'l Bank v. Gordon, 61 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1932).
113. See, e.g., Columbia Malting Co. v. Clausen, 3 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1924); Hobbs v.
Massasoit Whip Co., 158 Mass. 194, 33 N.E. 495 (1893).
114. Nor is it intended to suggest that the last shot rule was not correctly applied in
some cases described under the rubric of silence as acceptance. See, e.g., Fry v. Foster, 179
Okla. 398, 65 P.2d 1224 (1937)(inference of acceptance justified); Union Bank v. Shea, 57
Minn. 180, 58 N.W. 985 (1854)(abundant, repeated acts show intent to accept counter-offer).
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is intended to illustrate that the doctrine and its exceptions were
perceived to be part of a general contract formation process, and
that the focus of that process was upon the intent of the parties.
Thus, in situations where the last shot rule was clearly and auto-
matically applicable according to the Poel decision, the exception
to the silence-cannot-be acceptance rule was employed. When this
occurred, the inevitable focus of the decision was upon the intent
of the parties, which was treated as a question of fact, not as a
presumption. This alternative approach usually led to the opposite
result from that expected under the last shot doctrine.
Other cases did not bother to replace or displace the last shot
approach with another doctrine. Instead, they flatly refused to ap-
ply the principle because they expressly recognized that the doc-
trine should be invoked in a manner consistent with its rationale
only when the offeror intended to accept.11' Accordingly, some of
these cases suggest that in a variance situation, examination of all
of the conduct of the parties is necessary, and attention cannot
focus merely upon the writings nor upon the last form.11 6 One case
even expressly held that acts relative to the subject matter of the
transactions performed by the recipient of a variant acceptance
would not constitute acceptance when it was not the intent of the
offeror to accept.1 17
It is not surprising that opinions in this line of cases carefully
analyzed the basis of the last shot doctrine and concluded that the
intent of the parties was the rationale for that rule. For example,
when there existed evidence which justified the conclusion that the
intent of the offeror was to accept the counter-offer, then that in-
tent to accept, fairly implied and justified by the offeror's acts, fur-
nished the basis for the holding that a contract which included of-
feree's terms existed.118 It is evident that the courts employed an
objective theory and held that an offeror who received a variant
115. See, e.g., Georgia State Highway Dept. v. Wright, 107 Ga. App. 758, 131 S.E.2d
808 (1963) (inference of assent must be based on sufficient conduct); Fox v. Lisman, 208
Wis. 1, 237 N.W. 267 (1931),rev'd, 209 Wis. 1, 240 N.W. 809 (1932)(recognized that last shot
rule based on what must be justified evidence of intent); McKell v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
175 F. 329 (6th Cir. 1910)(course of conduct showed intent).
116. This approach was demonstrated in McKell v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 175 F. 329
(6th Cir. 1910).
117. See Georgia State Highway Dept. v. Wright, 107 Ga. App. 758, 131 S.E.2d 808
(1963).
118. See, e.g., id.; Todorovich v. Kinickinnic, 238 Wis. 39, 298 N.W. 226 (1941); Druck-
er v. Oppenheim, 165 N.Y.S. 289 (1917); McKell v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 175 F. 329 (6th
Cir. 1910); Union Bank v. Shea, 57 Minn. 180, 58 N.W. 985 (1854).
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acceptance would be bound by its terms only if the "reasonable
and fair deduction"'"9 (that is, inference) from the offeror's con-
duct was that he had accepted. The impression of acceptance
which the offeror's acts created in the offeree was of crucial impor-
tance in drawing this inference.
Other cases directly refused to apply the last shot doctrine be-
cause of the subject matter of the variance. One case, Celanese v.
John Clark Co.,' 2 0 held that it was avoiding the last shot rule. Af-
ter plaintiff wrote to defendant to inquire about nonflammable
hydraulic fluid for use in plaintiff's factory, the sales manager
wrote to plaintiff recommending a particular type of fluid which he
assured was "nonflammable.' 12 ' Plaintiff then sent his order form,
to which defendant replied with an acknowledgement form con-
taining a prominent warranty disclaimer."22 Relying on Halliburton
v. Millican,"52 the court held that a contract had been formed prior
to dispatch or receipt of the variant acknowledgement form."4 The
court refused to apply the last shot principle because of the sub-
stantive nature or content of the disclaimer and the understanding
of the offeror." 5 This approach was neither a rare or infrequent
occurrence.
Some cases flatly refused to apply the last shot doctrine when-
ever warranty disclaimers were involved in the variance. In
Moorehead v. Minneapolis Seed Co.,"' oral negotiations between
buyer and seller did not result in a contract at that time. Subse-
quently, the vendor sent a confirmation letter to the vendee which
119. See, e.g.,, Keith v. Aztec Land Co., 21 Ariz. 634, 643, 193 P. 535, 538 (1920). But
see Boston Lumber Co. v. Pendelton, 102 Conn. 626, 129 A. 782 (1925).
120. 214 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1954). This case did not apply the U.C.C.
121. Id. at 552 n. 2.
122. The acknowledgement form clearly stated that the defendant was willing to con-
tract only on its own terms and conditions. The court expressly recognized that the form
prominently referred to its terms and conditions, one of which stated: "Warranties and
Claims. Seller makes no warranty of any kind, express or implied, except that materials sold
hereunder shall be of Sellers standard quality, and buyer assumes all risk and liability what-
soever resulting from the use of such materials . Id. at 554 n. 4.
123. 171 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1948).
124. 214 F.2d at 554-55. The court enumerated that:
(1) the acknowledgement relied on was not contradicted, the contract having already
been made before the acknowledgement was sent to the plaintiff's office; and (2) if it
was a part of the contract and should be given effect as a covenant against warrant-
ing, it did not purport to, it did not, contract against its negligence and gross
negligence.
Id.
125. Id. at 555 n.7.
126. 139 Minn. 11, 165 N.W. 484 (1917).
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contained a warranty disclaimer and shipment and acceptance of
the delivery followed. The seeds failed to germinate, and the
vendee filed suit on a breach of express warranty theory. Although
the case involved the classic example of a situation to which the
last shot doctrine had been applied in the past,127 the court flatly
refused to do so,"2 8 and held that: "If a warranty was actually made
during the negotiations, and not withdrawn or modified, it should
be given effect irrespective of the printed disclaimers." ' Although
the court employed the device of finding that the contract was
formed by oral conversations prior to the dispatch of the form, a
policy reason against warranty disclaimers was also given as a rea-
son for this conclusion. That policy reason is significant for it is
normative: it implied that the court refused a last shot analysis
because of perceived unfairness. Such action was flatly contradic-
tory to the last shot rule.
Many other cases also recognized the unfairness of the last shot
doctrine in warranty disclaimer situations and refused to apply it.
In Edgar v. Breck,5 0 a case which clearly developed this exception,
after brief and cursory conversations about the qualities of a par-
ticular species of bulb, a retailer placed an order for lily bulbs
which were "true to increase."''3 A notice or bill which contained a
warranty disclaimer arrived at the same time as the bulbs. The
bulbs were defective and the vendee filed suit for breach of war-
ranty, to which the defendant interposed a defense of warranty
disclaimer. The court held that even though a writing was not exe-
cuted until later, the time of formation of the contract was when
the parties orally reached agreement. Thus, the court reasoned,
the warranty disclaimer was an attempt to add to or change a con-
tract which was already in existence. Such a change could only oc-
cur if the parties rescinded the oral contract and entered into a
127. For the typical last shot response in this situation, see Vaughan's Seed Store v.
Morris, 123 N.J.L. 26, 7 A.2d 868 (1939), where on virtually identical facts it was held, as a
matter of law, that the seller's terms, which eliminated virtually all remedies for defects,
controlled. See also Seattle Seed Co. v. Fujimori, 79 Wash. 123, 139 P. 866 (1914)(sack con-
tained card with warranty disclaimer); Blizzard Bros. v. Growers' Canning Co., 152 Iowa
257, 132 N.W. 66 (1911)(package had disclaimer printed upon it).
128. The court recognized that the sale was confirmed in the "usual" fashion by a
letter at the top of which appeared the following disclaimer: "We give no warranty, express
or implied, as to description, quality, productiveness, or any other matter, of any seeds we
send out, and we will not in any way be responsible for the crop ... " 139 Minn. at 13, 165
N.W. at 485.
129. Id. Moreover, the court held that the question was one for the jury.
130. 172 Mass. 581, 52 N.E. 1083 (1899).
131. Id. at 582, 52 N.E. at 1084.
1984
Duquesne Law Review
new contract with the warranty disclaimer term. 132
Other cases developed this basis for rejection of the last shot
rule without even bothering with the pretext of finding agreement
prior to the exchange of forms. Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farmss13 is
a good example. In that case, during what where conceded to be
merely negotiations, the vendor and vendee discussed a warranty.
However, after vendee placed his order, vendor's acknowledge-
ment, notice of shipment, and several other written communica-
tions included prominent warranty disclaimers. The Texas Court
of Civil Appeals, holding that the question of warranty disclaimer
was a question for the jury, emphasized that the descriptions of
the goods given by the vendor during negotiations, iE "not with-
drawn or modified . . . should be given effect, irrespective of the
printed disclaimers.'' s4 The language from the Davis decision
strongly suggested that, when warranties are disclaimed in later
communications, the last shot doctrine should not be applied as a
matter of law. Under this approach, it was not necessary to hold
that the contract had been formed prior to the dispatch of vendor's
forms in order to avoid application of the last shot principle. In-
stead, if the vendee justifiably and reasonably understood that a
warranty was being given as a result of preliminary negotiations,
then in spite of later repeated and clear written disclaimers in ven-
dor's forms, the disclaimer would be part of the contract only if the
vendee in fact knew of and consented to it.135 There were a fair
number of cases which flatly refused or came very close to express
refusal to apply the last shot doctrine in various situations involv-
ing warranty disclaimers. 136
132. Id. at at 582-83 52 N.E. at 1084. The court held that:
The contract was made when the parties made their oral agreement. It does not mat-
ter that at that time it was not evidenced by a memorandum in writing .... The
general printed warning ... that the defendant did not warrant seeds could have no
effect unless it led to the inference that the old contract had been rescinded ....
Id.
133. 255 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
134. 255 S.W. at 662 (emphasis added).
135. See also Ingraham v. Associated Oil Co., 166 Wash. 305, 6 P.2d 645 (1933)(jury
verdict ignoring disclaimer upheld); Smith Bros. Grain Co. v. Windsor, 242 S.W. 350 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922)(statements in description entitled to reliance).
136. See Bell v. Mills, 78 A.D. 42, 80 N.Y.S. 34 (1902); Landreth v. Wyckoff, 67 A.D.
145, 73 N.Y.S. 388 (1901). In Landreth, the warranty was clear and prominent:
D. Landreth & Sons give no warranty, express or implied, as to the description, quali-
ty, and productiveness, or any other matter, of any seeds they send out, and they will
not be in any way responsible for the crop. If the purchaser does not accept the goods
on these terms, they are at once to be returned.
67 A.D. at 146-47, 73 N.Y.S. at 389. Although this disclaimer was received by the purchaser
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B. Indirect Refusals to Employ the Last Shot Doctrine
In the above decisions, the refusal to apply that last shot doc-
trine was rather direct. In other cases the courts did not directly
refuse to apply the doctrine, but instead used several devices to
avoid the outcome which application of the last shot rule required.
One such device was simply to recognize that in many situations
the parties had reached agreement and formed a contract before
the last form was received. 13 7 For example, when shipment and re-
ceipt of the variant form occurred at the same time, several cases
held that the act of shipment alone was acceptance. 138 This meant,
of course, that the variant terms did not become part of the con-
tract between the parties. Although this result could have been
reached under the last shot doctrine, other cases made it clear that
they were using a fundamentally different theory. One good exam-
ple is Meadow River Lumber Co. v. Black. 39 There, the plaintiff's
form order was for a specific quantity of lumber free of heart, but
the defendant's acknowledgement provided that the lumber would
be of "average 8" wood. The wood delivered was not free of heart.
Recognizing that the issue of deciding the terms included in the
contract involved determining the intent of the parties,"0 the court
stated that, "[W]here the order . . .is made in writing the order
must be accepted or rejected according to its terms, and when [the
vendor] undertook to fill the order for the lumber, without a modi-
fication being agreed to, such act was an acceptance of the order
as written.' This decision and explanation are wholly inconsis-
tent with the last shot rule, because although the vendor had fired
the last shot, that is he sent the last form, the contract was formed
upon the terms in vendee's earlier writing. Similarly, other cases
held that when telegrams were exchanged, if the parties under-
stood that the telegrams were the basis of their bargain, then a
subsequent variant non-telegraphic confirmation would be of no
effect because the contract was already in existence when the ex-
change of telegrams concluded." 2 In several of these decisions the
prior to delivery, he did not read it. The court held that the disclaimer was ineffective. Id. at
147, 73 N.Y.S. at 389.
137. See Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, 255 S.W. 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
138. See Meadow River Lumber Co. v. Black, 26 Ala. App. 28, 153 So. 290 (1933),
aff'd, 228 Ala. 279, 153 So. 293 (1934); Stokes v. Hinton, 197 Ala. 280, 72 So. 502 (1916).
139. 26 Ala. App. 28, 153 So. 290 (1933), aff'd, 228 Ala. 279, 153 So. 293 (1934).
140. 26 Ala. App. 28, 153 So. at 292.
141. Id. (emphasis added)
142. See, e.g., Panhandle Refining Co. v. Bennett, 13 S.W.2d 923 (1924).
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courts apparently reasoned that if the offeree began any act of per-
formance before receipt of a variant form by the offeror, it was still
a question of fact whether the variant terms were part of the con-
tract and the crucial question was the understanding or intent of
the offeror." ' The important feature which must be emphasized
about all of these cases was that virtually every one of them in-
volved a situation in which the last shot rule was patently applica-
ble, and that rule, if applied, would have led to a different result.
Other cases emphasized the idea that the last shot principle in-
volved an objective theory of implication or inference. This theory
or approach recognized that finding acceptance involved a factual
conclusion which had to be justified.14 4 Thus, even though many of
the opinions claimed that they were following the Poel version of
the last shot doctrine which provides that the writings control, and
that the variance-acceptance problem is solved mechanically as a
matter of law, their methods of applying the last shot doctrine and
explanations were diametrically opposed to the Poel approach. In
these cases the last shot doctrine was employed only when the fac-
tual inference that the recipient of the last communication in-
tended to accept, or created the impression that he accepted, was
justified. On one hand, the Poel version of the doctrine held that
the last variant form was a counter-offer and that the court would
determine the significance of acts by the recipient subsequent
thereto as a matter of law. As has been pointed out, this doctrine
also provided as a rule of law or presumption that any act of the
recipient thereafter constituted acceptance regardless of the
knowledge or intent of the recipient. On the other hand, in the
cases just examined, the courts employed the term or label "matter
of law" in a profoundly different fashion. They meant that the
question of whether acceptance had occurred is for the court, but
in deciding that question, the courts treated it as an issue of fact,
and did not confine its examination to the four corners of the writ-
ings involved.1 45 This approach in turn meant that the deci-
sionmaker did not confine his attention to the last writing and the
143. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Millican, 171 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.
1948).
144. See, e.g., Keith v. Aztec Land & Cattle Co., 21 Ariz. 634, 193 P. 535 (1920). In
Keith, the court explained the "deduction to be drawn from defendants' conduct . . . is
that they were satisfied .... '[A]cceptance may be inferred where the parties enter on
the execution of the contract . Id. at 643, 193 P. at 538 (quoting 13 C.J. Contracts §
87) (emphasis added).




subsequent act of the recipient, and the decisionmaker certainly
did not treat the doctrine as involving a presumption of accept-
ance. In the cases under consideration, the courts recognized no
such limits, and invoked the last shot doctrine only where on all
the facts the inference of acceptance was justified. Thus, these
cases adopted an approach to the variance situation which simply
involved shifting the function of finding facts and making infer-
ences from the jury to the court. This process is familiar, for most
lawyers are aware of the variety of devices which have been used to
control lay juries.' 46 The objective of controlling the jury, however,
should not obscure the principle that, even though the determina-
tion of acceptance was assigned to a judge, many judges treated
the determination as a purely factual one involving the totality of
party acts and circumstances, not as a question of law involving
only the writings or the last writing. Some cases, such as Atlantic
Terra Cotta Co. v. Chesapeake Terra Cotta Co.,147 appeared to
have expressly recognized this approach by reasoning that where
variance problems occurred it was necessary to determine "'the in-
tention of the parties as gathered from the language used [when
interpreted] in the light of the surrounding circumstances.' ,,14 In
another case where the controversy involved terms of payment,
which in past dealings had always been in cash, insertion of pay-
ment terms in a variant acceptance was held binding because it
represented the actual intent or understanding of the parties.''
Similarly, in Wheeler v. Klaholt,150 the court held that after the
parties had engaged in business for many years on the basis of oral
orders which were followed by confirmation, the inference of ac-
ceptance of variant terms in the confirmation was justified.1 1 In
Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Bins & Equip. Co.,152
it was held that the question of which terms controlled in case of
variance was a factual matter for the jury.
Finally, the courts also employed adverse construction in some
cases involving warranties. They held that warranty disclaimers
146. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 227-345 (2d ed. 1977).
147. 96 Conn. 88, 113 A. 156 (1921).
148. Id. at 97, 113 A. at 159 (quoting Garber v. Goldstein, 92 Conn. 226, 227, 102 A.
605, 606 (1917)).
149. See, e.g., Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Singer Lumber Co., 168 So. 368 (La.
1936).
150. 178 Mass. 141, 59 N.E. 756 (1901).
151. Id.
152. 100 Ga. App. 847, 112 S.E.2d 626 (1959). Although the case was decided after the
Code was adopted, it did not involve the U.C.C.
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are disfavored and against public policy and therefore, knowledge
of disclaimer had to be clearly and affirmatively brought to the at-
tention of the offeror. 153 This approach was one which was defi-
nitely not hospitable to the last shot regime. When coupled with
the admonition adopted by some courts that warranty disclaimers
will be construed against their makers,'5 application of the last
shot principle was, as a practical matter, wholly prevented.
IV. CONCLUSION
The analysis of the case law above establishes that courts, ana-
lysts, and commentators were incorrect or misleading in describing
how pre-Code decisions dealt with the variance problem. In spite
of widespread assumptions to the contrary, many pre-Code deci-
sionmakers perceived the harshness and unfairness of the mirror
image and last shot doctrines, and they directly or indirectly
avoided them.
Because of the perceived unfairness of the mirror image rule,
many decisionmakers created exceptions in situations to which
that rule appeared to be patently applicable. Although many writ-
ers described these refusals to employ the standard approach as
minor exceptions involving mere details, requests, suggestions, or
implied terms, these exceptions contradicted the mirror image ap-
proach at a fundamental level. Instead of emphasizing the mere
existence of a variance, the focus in these cases was upon the ac-
tual intent, understanding, or expectation of the parties, which was
objectively determined from the entire factual context. These cases
also employed the concept of material variance.
The corollary of the mirror image rule known as the last shot
doctrine created even more serious problems. First, review of the
cases where that rule was employed illustrates that it was impossi-
ble to ascertain how it would be applied in a given case. Although
the content of the last shot doctrine was apparently clear, simple
and almost self-executing, the way in which that doctrine would be
applied in a particular case was impossible to predict. Nor did
courts employing the doctrine not explain why or how a particular
writing was chosen as the last shot. The last shot doctrine was
153. See, e.g., California & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corp. v. Harris, 27 F.2d 392
(S.D. Tex. 1928). This is a familiar situation to which the unconscionability doctrine is
also often applied.
154. See Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1945). See also
Ingraham v. Associated Oil Co. 166 Wash. 305, 6 P.2d 645 (1933).
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merely a process of classification or characterization.
Characterization involved an intuitive categorization or choice of
one writing-which might or might not be chronologically the last
communication-as the last shot, and the focus of the decision-
makers' inquiry thereafter shifted to whether there had or had not
been any action by the recipient which could constitute accept-
ance. Decision-makers, often faced with several plausible choices to
constitute the last shot, any of which apparently could have been
chosen with equal persuasiveness, selected or characterized one
and then recited the language of the last shot doctrine to justify
their choice. The flaw of this approach was that it did not explain
why the particular choice of a communication as the last shot pre-
vailed over other plausible and equally tenable choices. Characteri-
zation is a process which operates in an intuitive fashion. The intu-
itive nature of the characterization process probably prevented
courts from fashioning a coherent body of substantive principles in
the variance area, and probably contributed to their failure to de-
velop any consistent manner of application of the doctrine. The
most damaging consequence of this type of reasoning, however,
was that it caused decision-makers to lose sight of the basic and
fundamental goals of the contract formation process, of which the
variance problem was merely one part. That goal was to ascertain
the terms to which parties had assented.
A related feature of the last shot doctrine also contradicted the
basic goals of determining the mutual intent of the parties through
the creation of two presumptions. First, under that doctrine, it was
presumed that any variance in a writing was material in the sense
that the writer intended to contract only if his terms were in-
cluded. Second, it was presumed that any act relative to the sub-
ject matter after receipt of the writing with the variance was in-
tended as an acceptance by the recipient. These presumptions
often operated in a manner which was inconsistent with party in-
tent. In many cases where the last shot doctrine was employed, the
recipient of the communication chosen as the last shot was held to
be bound by terms of a counter-offer even though the sender knew
that the recipient did not know of the additional or different term.
In many of the same cases, it was equally clear that the varied
term, at the time information was sent, was not material to the
sender, who in no way intended to condition formation of a con-
tract upon inclusion of his new term. These were serious flaws.
Merely to list them illustrates why so many courts hesitated or re-
fused to employ the last shot rule.
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The cases refusing to apply the last shot approach either did so
expressly or resorted to a wide variety of obvious subterfuges and
flanking devices to avoid its application. Several features stand out
in these cases. Because the courts treated the problem as one of
mutual assent, a question of fact, the type or style of reasoning
employed was strikingly different from the standard last shot ap-
proach. The courts identified the basis or rationale of the last shot
doctrine and, in doing so-or perhaps because of doing so-treated
the problem of variance in a fashion which was consistent with the
basic objectives of the Anglo-American contract formation process.
These cases recognize that the conclusion of acceptance is pre-
mised upon a process of implication of assent from the actions of
the recipient of the variant communication. Recognition that this
was a process of implication led naturally to the conclusion that
acceptance could not be mechanically presumed. Instead, it was
necessary to determine the intent of the recipient as a question of
fact. Moreover, these decisions recognized that it was illogical and
arbitrary to presume that the mere existence of a variant term in a
writing ipso facto led to the conclusion that inclusion of that new
or different term was a condition of contracting. What this meant
was that the impression or expectation of the sender and of the
recipient of the counter-offer were relevant; that past dealings,
course of dealings, and performance of both parties, including ne-
gotiation, had to be taken into account; and that the subject mat-
ter of the contract, and the subject of the variant term were also
relevant. It is almost superfluous to point out that this factually
oriented, contextual approach fundamentally contradicted the last
shot doctrine.
Warranty disclaimer cases were another area where different
reasons for refusing to apply the Poel, last shot approach devel-
oped. There were many indirect evasions of the last shot principle
in warranty disclaimer cases. These cases also furnished the most
direct and explicit refusals to apply both the mirror image and last
shot doctrines. In fact, these cases announced an alternative rule
which flatly contradicted the Poel jurisprudence. In some cases, a
warranty made by a vendor during negotiations was held to be a
term of the contract, even though the court conceded that no con-
tract was formed until after written forms had been subsequently
exchanged. The principal basis for this rejection of the standard
last shot doctrine appeared to be the unfairness of applying that
doctrine to permit warranty disclaimer. The courts made it clear
that public policy was against disclaiming warranties or against
Vol. 22:595
Variance Problems
misleading the other party by appearing to give a warranty when,
in fact, none was being created. This rationale rested squarely
upon the idea fundamental to American contract law that party
assent freely and knowingly given is essential to contract formation
and inclusion of terms. Other decisions explained that, because
warranty disclaimers were disfavored, they would be construed
against the maker of the disclaimer. Some decisions went further
and held that warranty disclaimers had to be clearly and affirma-
tively brought to the attention of the vendee. This group of deci-
sions strongly suggested that, in a warranty disclaimer situation, as
a matter of law the last shot principle was not applicable.
This was a novel approach to variance. The focus in this line of
cases was upon the subject matter of the additional material war-
ranty disclaimers. One result of this approach was the recognition
that materiality or the presumed materiality of the variance to the
vendee was an important consideration in the analysis of problems
of this type, and materiality is affected by the subject of the vari-
ance. Standing in stark contrast to the standard last shot ap-
proach, this last development sought to implement the general
objectives of the law of contracts on the subject of consent to new
terms in deciding variance questions.
This review of the common law cases which were precursors to
the Code fundamentally contradicts what common law and Code
writers described as the law of variance. Many cases decided prior
to the Code recognized the difficulty inherent in resolving the vari-
ance problem. They recognized that variance is a complex problem,
which may occur for a variety of reasons, which may occur in a
myriad of ways, and which may involve a diversity of subjects. Ac-
cordingly, they fashioned a number of alternative approaches or
solutions to the variance problem. These alternative approaches
were consistent with the goals of the contract formation process
and the policies sought to be served by that process.
Drawing upon inaccurate analysis of common law approaches to
variance, many courts and modern writers have made a number of
unjustified assumptions. These writers assume that at common
law, the variance problem was perceived as simple and treated ac-
cordingly. In the view of these writers, prior to the Code, the
mechanical, simplistic approach of the mirror image and last shot
doctrine reigned supreme and unchallenged in the variance area.
Those who are unaware of history are doomed to repeat it. It is
submitted that modern treatment of the variance problem is more
likely to be effective if those incorrect assumptions about the na-
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ture of the variance problem and its common law solutions are dis-
pelled. It is also submitted that modern approaches to variance,
and especially section 207 of the Code, recognize the complexity of
the variance problem and seek to bring treatment of the problem
into line with the basic goals of the agreement process and the gen-
eral substantive policies of the Code. Many of these modern Code
goals have been ignored because of reliance on common law ways
of thinking about variance and its solutions. If the goals of the
Code and other modern approaches to variance are to be accom-
plished, the pernicious effects of the common law conceptualiza-
tions of the variance problem must by identified and avoided.
If the Code solution to the variance problem is interpreted and
applied by the courts in the rigid and doctrinaire fashion of the
mirror image and last shot rules-and there is considerable evi-
dence that it has been-then the Code will be no improvement in
resolving variance problems. A subsequent article will analyze the
new process, goals and approaches of the Code to the variance
problem.
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